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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Mario A. Reyes appeals from the judgment of conviction issued

after a jury

guilty of domestic battery with a traumatic injury, attempted strangulation,

Reyes challenges several of the

district court’s evidentiary rulings

found Reyes

and aggravated

assault.

and a statement made by a

prosecutor in closing argument.

Of The

Statement

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Mario A. Reyes choked

his wife, Marina,

threw an iron

at her,

pulled her t0 the ground

her hair, and kicked her in the face hard enough to knock her unconscious.
p.223, L.19.)

The

state

by

p.218, L.12

(T12,

—

charged Reyes With several offenses, including domestic battery with a

traumatic injury, attempted strangulation, and aggravated battery. (R., pp.42-43.)

The case went

(R., pp.145-73.)

t0 trial.

Laura Neri (“Laura”), Marina’s niece, testiﬁed

at the trial.

(TL, p.212, L.20

According to her testimony, she was out in the backyard listening
Marina, and Reyes.

(TL, p.214, L.23

—

p.215, L.13.)

Reyes

t0

— p.213,

L.1.)

music with her husband,

insisted that he

and Marina g0

t0

sleep, but

Marina said n0. (TL, p.215, Ls.16-25.) Reyes was grabbing Marina’s

Ls.4-6.)

A11 four adults went back inside the house, and Reyes continued insisting that he and

Marina go
hurting

to

bed and grabbing Marina’s

my wrist.”

wrist. (TL, p.2 1 6, Ls.7-13.)

wrist. (TL, p.216,

Marina told Reyes, “‘You’re

(TL, p.216, Ls.7-13.)

Reyes and Marina went

into their

bedroom.

(Tr.,

p.217, Ls.3-5.) Laura and her husband

stayed 0n the couch in the living room. (Tr., p.217, Ls.6-13.) Laura heard “banging 0n the wall

and yelling” coming from the bedroom.

went

to

open the bedroom door.

(Tr.,

(Tr.,

p.217, Ls.17-23.)

p.217, L.24

— p.218,

L.4.)

She woke up her husband and

When

she opened the

bedroom

door, she

saw that Reyes “had Marina up against the wall by her neck” with his

her neck.”

He was

p.218, Ls.12-20, p.219, Ls.9-15.)

(Tr.,

right

holding an iron in his

p.218, Ls.21-24.) Marina “looked like she had been crying, and she

was red

[in]

“hand around

left

hand.

(T12,

the face.” (TL,

p.219, Ls.16-21.)

Reyes

Marina g0, but the two kept “arguing and ﬁghting.”

let

were just going

at

at

— p.221,

each other.

Marina up when Reyes kicked Marina
Marina was knocked unconscious.

she

was

t0

just face

Marina.

(Tr.,

p.221, L.24

down, and

(Tr.,

hair.”

— p.222,

(Tr.,

L.4.)

As they were

p.222, Ls.5-7.) Marina

p.222, Ls.8—10.) Laura stood up and

was

fell

trying

in the face. (Tr., p.222, Ls.1 1-18.)

(Tr.,

p.222, L.25

there[ was] a lot 0f blood.”

— p.223,

(Tr.,

L. 1 9.) “[S]he wasn’t

p.222, L.25

— p.223,

moving,

L.2.)

Reyes

When Marina “came around,

she said her head hurt[].” (Tr., p.223, Ls. 14-19.) Laura put Marina’s head 0n a pillow and told

her not to move.
State’s EX. 53.)

(Tr.,

p.223, Ls.14-19.)

Marina bled

The police arrived “shortly

Laura also testiﬁed
“wouldn’t stop.”

(Tr.,

that, at

over the pillow.

(Tr.,

p.234, Ls.5-8;

after.” (Tr., p.223, Ls. 14-19.)

some point during the

p.224, Ls.15-19.)

all

altercation, she called

She explained

911 because Reyes

t0 the jury that she did not

speak to a

dispatcher “[b]ecause [she] didn’t want to lose contact with [her] aunt.” (Tr., p.224, L.23

L.

(TL,

,

yelled out, “‘She’s faking. She always fakes.” (Tr., p.223, Ls.3-8.)

[]

at

break up the ﬁght. (TL, p.22 1 Ls.6-9.) A11

Reyes “reached over and pulled [Marina’s]

on Laura, and both women fell t0 the ground.
to help

“They

L.5.)

four adults then started walking out 0f the room.

out,

Reyes threw an iron

(TL, p.220, Ls.20-24.)

Laura and her husband were eventually able

walking

p.219, Ls.9-15.)

each other like a ﬁstﬁght.” (TL, p.220, Ls.5-8.) They were “hitting each other”

and throwing stuff
p.220, L.25

(Tr.,

1 .)

Instead, she just

— p.225,

hung up and hoped the dispatcher would ﬁgure out Where she called from.

The prosecutor asked Laura

(TL, p.225, Ls.2-5.)

law enforcement

t0 lie

and

tell

Reyes

on the night of the

altercation, she

that the neighbors called the police.

defense counsel objected on the basis that

p.226, Ls.18—21.)

“[i]t’s irrelevant.”

(Tr.,

p.226, L.25

— p.227,

L.1.)

The

overruled the obj ection, and Laura explained that she had asked law enforcement t0

protect her relationship With Marina. (TL, p.227, Ls.7-15.)

lie to

Laura’s husband also testiﬁed.

Marina by the wrist and forced her

t0

He

(TL, p.266, Ls.5-24.)

go to

their

bedroom.

(T12,

testiﬁed that Reyes grabbed

into the

by

there

bedroom and saw Reyes “had [Marina] up

He

the neck.” (Tr., p.272, Ls.4-8.)

all started

against a wall grabbing her

by — holding her

testiﬁed that, after he and Laura broke

(TL, p.273, Ls.14

to fall to the ground.

Reyes kicked Marina

in the face as

state also called

testiﬁed that he

He testiﬁed that he went

up the ﬁght,

walking out 0f the bedroom and Reyes “yanked [Marina] by her hair” causing

Marina and Laura

The

He testiﬁed that

p.270, Ls.3-16.)

he heard screaming and ﬁghting in the bedroom. (TL, p.271, Ls.1 1-17.)

they

(T12,

had asked

When the prosecutor asked Laura for an explanation Why,

Laura answered yes. (TL, p.226, L.22.)

district court

if,

Marina was trying

—

p.274, L.12.)

to stand

And

back up. (Tn, p.274, Ls.13-21.)

two medical professionals Who assessed Marina’s

examined Marina shortly

after the

he testiﬁed that

injuries.

A dentist

abuse occurred and found she had “soft tissue

trauma” in the front 0f her mouth and “three of her front teeth had fractured enamel.” (Tn, p.309,
L.9

-

310, L.16.)

L.20 — p.3 1

1,

Her

L.2.)

injuries required

at the

surgery as well as crowns on her teeth.” (TL, p.310,

An emergency medical physician testiﬁed that he

the abuse occurred and found that she

blood

“gum

examined Marina the night

had “swelling t0 the forehead,” “swelling to the nose,” “dried

nose,” “bruising around the face,” and “redness in the upper chest area.” (TL, p.326,

L22 — p.327,

L.21, p.332, Ls.6-17.)

nose. (T12, p.333, Ls.10-15.)

He

also testiﬁed that a

CT scan showed Marina had a broken

The

state also

to hear Marina’s testimony.

wanted the jury

The

(TL, p.342, Ls.18-23.)

prosecutor asked the district court t0 allow the state to read Marina’s preliminary hearing transcript
t0 the jury because, in the state’s View,

23.)

The defense objected and argued Marina was

a subpoena (albeit for the

on

Marina was unavailable

May 4 When the trial
The

state

wrong

started

date)

0n

(TL, p.342, Ls.18-

as a Witness.

available because the state successfully served

and the defense had served Marina a subpoena

May 2.

presented four witnesses

show up

t0

(TL, p.344, Ls.2-21.)

who

testiﬁed about their efforts to subpoena Marina.

Earl Lindauer, an investigator With the prosecutor’s ofﬁce, testiﬁed that he went t0 Marina’s house

on

either April 16 or April 17 to serve her With a subpoena, but

— p.352,

L.1.)

On April 23,

he found Marina

take the subpoena, Lindauer left

served.

(TL, p.352, L.18

he served had

May

—

it

trial

work. (TL, p.352, Ls.2-17.)

on the ground

p.353, L.2.)

16 for the

at

n0 one answered. (TL, p.351,

in front of her

When

and advised her

The next day, however, Lindauer

she refused t0

that she

had been

realized the subpoena

date instead of May 2. (TL, p.353, Ls.3-5, p.354, Ls.9-12.)

April 30, Lindauer went back t0 Marina’s house twice to try t0 serve a subpoena for the

trial date,

L. 14

On

May 2

but n0 one answered. (TL, p.353, Ls.6-12.)

Tony Thompson, another

investigator with the prosecutor’s ofﬁce, testiﬁed that he tried to

serve Marina on four different occasions. (Tr., p.356, Ls.1-22.)

house for 45 minutes

starting at

On April

11,

he

sat outside

ofher

seven in the morning and then went back for an hour and a half at

8:45 in the morning, but he did not see any movements. (TL, p.356, Ls.1-22.)
Jackie Smith, a Victim Witness coordinator With the prosecutor’s ofﬁce, testiﬁed that she

had sent Marina “numerous
L.5.)

text

messages” and “attempted

to call” her. (TL, p.358, L.25

But Marina did not answer her phone, her voicemail was

text messages. (T12, p.358, L.25

— p.359,

L.5.)

full,

— p.359,

and she did not respond

to the

Ofﬁcer
p.345, L.11

L.

1 .)

Ivie testiﬁed that

— p.346,

L.1.)

He

Even though Marina’s

he

the

wrong

district court

date

car

was

in the driveway, Marina’s daughter

— p.346,

would not

took judicial notice of the scheduling issues that caused the

trial.

(TL, p.354, Ls.16

fact that the erroneous

—

May

p.355, L.4, p.364, Ls.3-1

It

to appear

that

Ofﬁcer

IVie

The

(Tr.,

The

p.364, Ls.12-23.)

Marina was unavailable as a witness and allowed the

state t0

was

the

district court

state.

(Tr.,

p.364,

Marina decides

also observed that the state should not have to bear the risk 0f Whether

based 0n the defense’s subpoena.

state to list

16 date

1.)

found that Marina “has been actively avoiding the service 0f process” from the
Ls.3-5.)

let

— p.346,

L.18.)

on the subpoena, including the

alternative date for the

day of trial. (TL,

ﬁrst

“spent several hours” at Marina’s house. (T12, p.345, L.11

enter the house. (Tr., p.345, L.11

The

May 2—the

Marina on

tried to serve

district court thus

found

read her preliminary hearing

testimony t0 the jury. (TL, p.364, L.24 — p.365, L.9.)
In the preliminary hearing transcript read t0 the jury,

needed

g0

to

t0

bed and grabbed her

bedroom and argued. (TL, p.372,
Ls.6-15.)

He

up the ﬁght.
[her]

from

wrist.

p.371, L.17

(T12,

Reyes

Ls.2-5.)

Marina testiﬁed

hit

—

p.372, L.1.)

that

They went

Marina and then choked

also threw a clothes iron at Marina. (TL, p.372, Ls.19-24.) Laura

(Tr.,

and “threw

[her] t0 the ﬂoor,

and

that’s

The kick broke Marina’s nose and “blacked

Several police ofﬁcers also testiﬁed for the

ofﬁcer on the scene.

(TL, p.169, Ls.4-18.)

husband. (TL, p.170, L.11 — p.171, L.2.)
into the house.”

her.

came

into the

(TL, p.372,
in

and broke

p.372, Ls.16-18.) Marina walked out 0f the bedroom, and then Reyes “pulled

[her] hair”

p.373, Ls.4-10.)

Reyes said they

(Tr.,

He

He

state.

when

[Reyes] kicked [her].” (TL,

[her] out.” (TL, p.373, Ls.1 1-23.)

Ofﬁcer

Ivie testiﬁed that

he was the ﬁrst

heard yelling and then saw Reyes and Laura’s

told

them

t0 “stay right there,” but

Reyes “dipped

p.172, Ls.10-20.) Ofﬁcer Ivie instructed Reyes to stop, but Reyes did not

listen.

(TL, p.172, L.21

Marina and Laura.

— p.173,

(Tr.,

p.173, Ls.4-14.)

cheekbones were swollen.” (TL,

was covered

Ofﬁcer

L.3.)

p.

1

IVie followed

Reyes

into the

home and found

Marina “was bleeding from the nose” and “her
She had her head 0n a pillow, “[a]nd the pillow

76, Ls.17-24.)

in blood.” (Tr., p.173, Ls.4-14.)

Ofﬁcer King, another responding ofﬁcer, testiﬁed about
several pictures that he took in the

home. He testiﬁed

that

his observations in the

home and

he ﬁrst saw Marina and Laura and a

pillow near Marina that “was basically covered in fresh and dried blood.”

(Tr.,

p.380, Ls.15-20.)

He found a small amount ofblood 0n the bedroom door and some blood on the bed in the bedroom
Where some 0f the abuse occurred.

p.383, L.1

(Tr.,

—

p.394, L.25; State’s Exs. 44-75.)

testiﬁed that he “walked out through the back patio and completed a safety
as well”

and did not see any blood 0n the back patio.

The defense put 0n

three Witnesses.

(Tr.,

p.390, L.20

Marina testiﬁed

ﬁrst.

also

sweep 0f the backyard

— p.391,

(Tr.,

He

L.2.)

Marina

p.571, Ls.5-8.)

invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self—incrimination and refused t0 answer any questions
about the night the abuse occurred.

Reyes testiﬁed

next.

(Tr.,

(Tr.,

p.571, L.23

p.573, Ls.13-17.)

— p.572,

He

L.15.)

testiﬁed that he spent time with Marina,

Laura, and Laura’s husband on the night in question. (Tr., p.574, Ls.17-18.)

and then went home and

mood was

sat at a table

0n the back

(Tr.,

p.574, L.22

“complicated” because Reyes had been arguing With

involvement with

this other

L22 — p.577, L. 1 5

.)

woman

with

whom

[he]

this

was involved with

— p.576,

to a bar

L.21.)

The

Wife “about [Reyes’s]
sexually.”

(Tr.,

p.576,

He told the jury that he went t0 bed by himself and that he locked the bedroom

door behind him “because When [he] argue[s] With
p.577, L.16

patio.

They went

— p.578,

voices, and “the door

L.20.)

He

[his] Wife, [he]

testiﬁed that noises outside

was pushed open really hard.”

(Tr.,

usually close[s] the door.” (Tr.,

0n the patio woke him up, he heard

p.578,

L23 — p.579,

L.7.) Then,

Reyes

testiﬁed, Marina, Laura,

(T12,

p.579, L.8

and Laura’s husband

— p.580,

He

p.581, Ls.6-14.)

L.14.)

all

Reyes said he

threw things

Reyes and

started hitting Reyes.

the house and found the police outside.

left

also testiﬁed that he did not

at

(TL,

have any blood on him. (TL, p.582, Ls.7-12.)

After Reyes’s direct examination, the prosecutor raised several issues with the district

court.

He wanted

t0 use a past conviction for witness intimidation t0

incident 0f domestic Violence t0

his

bedroom and locking

show Reyes does

not, as

impeach Reyes; a past

he claimed, have a practice of going in

the door after ﬁghting with this wife; and Reyes’s felony probation to

show, as a condition of the probation, Reyes should not have been in the bar drinking. (TL, p.583,
L.5

As

—

p.584, L22.) Reyes’s counsel objected across the board.

to the conviction for witness intimidation

(TL, p.583, L.15

—

and past incident of domestic Violence, the

court weighed the probative value against the prejudice and found both admissible.

L.24 — p.590, L.1

Near the

1.)

start

The

district court

p.593, L.1.)

(T12,

district

p.586,

did not rule on the probation issue.

0f the prosecutor’s cross-examination, he asked Reyes about his probation.

The following exchange occurred:
Q. On July 16th of 2017 you were 0n felony probation; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So you were not supposed to be in a bar were you?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m going t0 object t0 relevance.

THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Correct.
Q.

BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: And you were not supposed to be

drinking either,

were you?
A. Correct?

(T12,

p.595, Ls.6-17.)

The prosecutor then

transitioned to Reyes’s claimed practice of going in his

locking the door after being in a ﬁght with his wife.

(Tr.,

p.595, L.18

— p.596,

L.12.)

room and

He handed

Reyes a copy 0fthe police report from the past domestic Violence.

(E

Tr., p.596,

Ls.13- 1 9.) The

following exchange occurred:

Q. D0 you
A. No.

know What this

is,

Mr. Reyes?

Q. This is a report from the Caldwell Police Department dated November 8th of
2015. It alleges you committed the criminal offense of attempted strangulation,

domestic battery, malicious injury t0 property, and Witness intimidation.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m going to object.

THE COURT:
Q.

BY

Overruled.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: You remember

this incident,

do you

not,

Mr.

Reyes?
A. Yes.
(TL, p.596, Ls.13-24.) The prosecutor then asked Reyes about the details 0f the past incident, but
the district court sustained a

Reye’s counsel

elicited

number 0f objections. (TL, p.596, L.25 — p.603,

from Reyes

that all

0f the charges mentioned by the prosecutor were

dismissed except the inﬂuencing a witness charge.

The

and Marina. (TL, p.610, Ls.8-1

was out on
that

his

p.607, Ls. 10-21.)

1,

p.61

back patio smoking a

1,

Ls.18-20.)

cigarette.

(Tr.,

testiﬁed he

was a neighbor of Reyes

He testiﬁed that, on the night ofthe
p.612, L.21

— p.613,

L.19.)

He

abuse, he

told the jury

he heard a crash in the neighbor’s yard, looked over the fence, and saw Marina “0n the ground

ﬂat face.”

(Tr.,

p.614, Ls.7—1

p.615, Ls.16-18.)

He

Reynolds said that Marina was alone on the back porch.

1.)

(Tr.,

p.615, L.19

heard banging in the house and a
later the police

On

woman

—

p.616, L.19.) Within a minute, Reyes testiﬁed, he

yelling in Spanish.

and paramedics showed up.

(Tr.,

p.619,

(Tr.,

p.617, Ls.3-23.)

L22 — p.620,

L.

Ten minutes

1 .)

cross—examination, the prosecutor elicited from Reynolds that he met Reyes in

p.622, L.23

(Tr.,

testiﬁed that Marina pulled herself up, covered her nose with one hand, and

walked inside the house.

(Tr.,

(Tr.,

was Richard Reynolds, Who

third defense Witness

L.24.) In redirect,

— p.623,

L.1.)

Reynolds conﬁrmed

that

jail.

he had “plenty of occasions” t0 talk to

Reyes while

in jail

and

that

he never told law enforcement his version 0f what happened the night

the abuse occurred. (TL, p.625, L.22

— p.626,

L.1, p.628, L.21

— p.629,

L.10.)

During the prosecutor’s closing argument, she said the following:

emergency room doctors, t0 a dentist,
from
her again today shouldn’t prevent
you
you from doing What needs to be done. You have all 0f the evidence t0 convict the
defendant in this case 0f all 0f these charges.
Certainly Marina is probably scared.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m going to object at this point.
Marina was brave enough

under oath. The

THE COURT:

to tell her story t0

fact that

didn’t hear

it

argument.

It’s

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: A11 right.
[PROSECUTOR]: Why would she want t0 come in and say What happened again?
Tell a room full 0f strangers that the person who vowed to love, honor, and cherish
her did this t0 her
(Tn, p.652, L.24

— p.653,

.

.

.

.

L.19.)

The jury convicted Reyes 0f domestic
strangulation,

and aggravated

assault.1

battery With

(R., pp.175-76.)

The

a traumatic injury,

district court

attempted

imposed a uniﬁed

aggregate sentence of ﬁve years ﬁxed and ﬁve years indeterminate. (R., p.225.)

Reyes timely appealed.

1

The

L.7.)

found insufﬁcient evidence to support the aggravated battery charge and
0n the lesser-included offense 0f aggravated assault. (TL, p.536, L.7 — p.549,

district court

instructed the jury

(R., pp.232-33.)

ISSUES
Reyes

states the issues

Did

I.

0n appeal

as:

the district court err and abuse

its

discretion

by allowing

the State t0

introduce irrelevant and highly prejudicial propensity evidence regarding
alleged instances in which Mr. Reyes did not follow his “usual” practice 0f

locking himself in his

Did the

room during an argument With his Wife?

II.

by admitting Ms. Reyes’s
preliminary hearing testimony because Ms. Reyes was available for trial
and thus her preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible hearsay?

III.

Did

court abuse

district

its

discretion

by allowing the State t0 introduce irrelevant
evidence that Mr. Reyes was 0n probation at the time 0fthese alleged crimes
the district court err

and thus should not have been

Did the

IV.

how

district court err

in a bar 0r drinking alcohol?

by admitting Ms. Neri’s

she asked ofﬁcers not to

tell

irrelevant testimony about
Mr. Reyes she had called 91 1?

Did the district court err by allowing the prosecutor t0 imply in closing that
Ms. Reyes did not testify because she was scared and was reluctant to
testify?

Should this Court vacate Mr. Reyes’s judgment of conviction because, even
harmless, together they deprived Mr. Reyes
0f his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a fair trial?

VI.

if these errors are individually

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Did

the district court

commit

reversible error

when

it

allowed the

state t0 introduce

evidence of a past incident 0f domestic Violence?

II.

failed t0 show that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
Marina’s preliminary hearing testimony after ﬁnding Marina was unavailable to testify

Has Reyes

for the state?

III.

Did

the district court

commit

reversible error

when

it

allowed the

state t0 introduce

evidence that Reyes was on felony probation and should not have been
IV.

Has Reyes
that she

failed to

show

that the district court erred

asked the ofﬁcers not to

tell

Reyes

10

when

it

at the

bar?

allowed Laura to testify

that she called the police?

Has Reyes

show

When

allowed the prosecutor t0 say
in closing argument that Marina did not testify because she was scared of talking about
failed to

her abuse in a
VI.

Has Reyes

room

failed t0

ﬁlll

that the district erred

it

0f people she did not know?

show

that the cumulative error doctrine requires a

11

new trial?

ARGUMENT
I.

The

A.

District

Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Use
Reves’s Past Fight With Marina To Attack Reves’s Credibility

Introduction

The

district court

did not

commit

reversible error

When

it

allowed the jury t0 hear about

Reyes’s past ﬁght With Marina. Once Reyes testiﬁed that he has a practice 0f going t0 his bedroom
alone and locking his door after ﬁghting with his wife, the fact that Reyes had not done so after a
past ﬁght

became

relevant to Reyes’s credibility. While the district court should not have allowed

the jury to hear about the related criminal charges, the error

Standard

B.

was harmless.

Of Review

“The question of whether evidence
admit relevant evidence

is

is

relevant

is

reviewed de novo, while the decision to

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.” State

V.

Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,

228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Reversible Error When He Questioned Reyes About His
With Marina

Past Fight

The

district

court properly overruled Reyes’s

Rule 404(b) objection

to

the

facts

surrounding the past ﬁght between Reyes and his wife. Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of

evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “t0 prove a person’s character in order t0 show 0n a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance With the character.” I.R.E. 404(b)(1).

“evidence

may be

But

this

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 0f mistake, 0r lack 0f accident.” I.R.E. 404(b)(2).

The

list

of purposes in Rule 404(b)

988 P.2d

1

170,

1

175

(1 999).

is

not exhaustive.

E

State V. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501,

For example, under Rule 404(b), the

12

district court

can admit evidence

“introduced for purposes 0f impeachment” because

and

credibility is

always relevant.”

I_d.

at

“it

necessarily involves a witness’ credibility,

503, 988 P.2d at 1177 (internal quotations omitted).

“The admissibility of evidence offered pursuant
State V. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308,

analysis.”

to

Rule 404(b) requires a two-step

336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014).

evidence

“First, the

m

‘must be sufﬁciently established as fact and relevant as a matter of law to a material and disputed
issue other than the character 0r criminal propensity of the defendant.”

Paw,

the danger ofunfair prejudice.”

I_d.

(quoting

is

Paw, 152 Idaho

Rule 404(b) does not prohibit the admission 0f evidence
133 Idaho

at

individuals.

at 1175.

not substantially outweighed by
at

689, 273 P.3d at 1282).

that a witness lied.

E

Hairston,

503, 988 P.2d at 1177. In Hairston, the state charged the defendant with murdering

Li. at 500,

988 P.2d

at

showing the defendant shot a convenience
P.2d

(Quoting

152 Idaho 678, 688, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281 (2012)). “Second, the court must determine

pursuant t0 Rule 403 that ‘the probative value of the evidence

two

Li

The

district court initially

1174.

The prosecutor sought

store clerk

t0 introduce evidence

two days before the murders. Li

excluded the evidence but allowed

its

at 501,

988

admission after the

defendant testiﬁed that he had never shot a gun before the charged murders, he had never seen

anyone shot before the charged murders, and he had never pointed a gun
502, 988 P.2d at 1176.

The Idaho Supreme Court afﬁrmed

Rule 404(b) because, “[o]nce

[the defendant] testiﬁed that

at

anyone before.

I_d.

at

the admission of the evidence under

he had not ﬁred the gun prior to [the

charged murders], that he had never seen anyone shot before, and that he had never pointed a gun
at

anyone, the Colorado evidence became relevant t0 impeach his credibility.”

P.2d

at

I_d.

at

502-03, 988

1176-77.
Similarly, in State V. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584,

808 P.2d 1329

(Ct.

App. 1991), the

district

court admitted a witness’s written statement that the defendant “had gotten out ofjail yesterday”

13

after the witness testiﬁed that the

defendant had been living with the witness for “[a]bout two

The Idaho Court of Appeals observed

days.” Li. at 587, 808 P.2d at 1332.

statement

“may

not have been a ‘direct contradiction

9”

that,

While the written

to the witness’s testimony,

it still

doubt upon [the witness’s] testimony implying that [the defendant] was residing in the
until the time

0f the incident.”

808 P.2d

Li. at 588,

relevant because, “Whenever evidence

is

the district court.

The
this case.

Mg;

and

its

is

always relevant.”

Li.

33. Similarly, evidence that

Mg

support the district court’s

it

cast doubt

Reyes did not g0

previously fought With his Wife

was

the night of the abuse, he

went

practice. (Tr., p.589, L.21

— p.590,

district court

necessarily

After also ﬁnding the

initial

0n the witness’s testimony

Mg;

to his

afﬁrmed

prejudicial because

it

But the

Rule 404(b) ruling in

L.1

at

that the defendant

587-88, 808 P.2d at 1332-

cast doubt

on Reyes’s testimony

that,

0n

bedroom alone and locked

the door because that

was

his

it

1.)

properly found the evidence

was minimally

prejudicial.

was

revealed Reyes had previously fought with his Wife.
district court limited the

not to connect the past ﬁght to “any

.

.

.

had

bedroom alone and lock the door when he had

relevant because

t0 his

119 Idaho

court acknowledged, the questioning about Reyes’s past ﬁght with his wife

1.)

it

unfair prejudice, the Idaho Court of Appeals

been living with the witness for about two days.

p.590, L1

the statement

the witness’s written statement that the defendant “had gotten out ofjail

yesterday” was relevant because

The

The court thus found

home up

I_d.

logic of Hairston

In

1333.

introduced for purposes of impeachment,

involves a witness’ credibility, and credibility
statement’s probative value outweighed

at

“cast

amount of prejudice by

criminal charges” and

14

by

As

at least

the district

somewhat

(TL, p.589, L.21

—

instructing the prosecutor

sustaining obj ections to limit the

amount oftestimony the prosecutor could elicit so
(T12,

p.587, Ls.4-13, p.602, L.7

The

district court also

(TL, p.589, L.21

Marina

started

—

— p.604,

L.22.)

properly found Reye’s past ﬁght With his Wife “highly relevant.”

p.590, L11.)

when he

as to avoid “retry[ing] the entire [past] incident.”

The

state’s witnesses testiﬁed that

physically forced her t0 go into the

bedroom With him. (Lg,

Ls.3-16.) Reyes, at least implicitly, tried t0 counter that testimony

gone

actually

to the

jury t0 believe

bedroom alone and locked

him 0n the

basis that he

was

Reyes’s physical abuse 0f

by

Tr.,

p.270,

telling the jury that

he had

the door. (TL, p.578, Ls.4-14.)

And he

asked the

acting consistent With his “usua1[]” behavior

when he

fought With his Wife. (TL, p.578, Ls. 1 0-20.) The state’s evidence that Reyes had acted inconsistent

with his alleged practice thus called into question Reyes’s version 0f events 0n the night of the

ﬂ

abuse.

Hairston, 133 Idaho at 503, 988 P.2d at 1177 (holding probative value of evidence

contradicting defendant’s testimony outweighed unfair prejudice because

defense adopted

it

impeached “the

at trial”).

Reyes argues

that the state could not use the past

conduct as impeachment evidence

because Reyes testiﬁed only that he “usually” goes t0 his room alone and locks the door after
ﬁghting with his wife—not that he “always” does

so.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)

But

his

argument ignores the context in which he made the statement. His attorney asked him to explain

why, on the night 0f the abuse, Reyes locked the door to
his wife.

Wife,

I

(Tr.,

usually close the door.” (T12, p.578, Ls.19-20.) His response

suggests 0n appeal, he used “usually” t0

after

ﬁghting with his wife. (Appellant’s

by

bedroom When he went t0 bed Without

p.578, L.18.) In response, Reyes testiﬁed: “Well, because

now

if,

his

“usually,”

Reyes meant

that, as

when

I

makes n0 sense

mean he only sometimes engages

brief, pp. 14-15.) Instead, his

a rule, he goes

15

argue with

by himself into

if,

as

my

Reyes

in that conduct

response only makes sense
the

bedroom and locks

the

door

webster.com/dictionarV/usually

telling the jury: I

d0

went

ﬁght With

after I

E

ﬁghting With his wife.

after

in the

my wife.

(last Visited

Usually, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam—

NOV.

1,

2019) (“as a

bedroom by myself and locked
Evidence showing

In effect,

rule”).

the door because that

that, in the past,

is

Reyes was
just

what

I

he had not actually engaged in

that practice in similar circumstances contradicted that testimony.

Reyes’s argument also ignores that evidence does not have t0 directly contradict a witness’s
testimony t0 impeach the Witness.

Mg,

For example, as the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in

the witness’s written statement that the defendant “had gotten out ofjail yesterday”

was

not a “direct contradiction” 0f the witness’s testimony that the defendant had been living with the

Witness for “[ajbout two days.” Ar_ledg§, 119 Idaho at 587, 808 P.2d

But the written statement was

still

relevant because

it

showing

I_d.

at 588,

that, in the past,

808 P.2d

at

1332 (emphasis added).

“tended to contradict” and “cast doubt upon

[the witness’s] testimony implying that [the defendant]

of the incident.”

at

was

residing in the

1333 (emphasis added).

Reyes had not locked himself in

In the

bedroom

his

home up until the

time

same way, evidence

after a

ﬁght With his wife

tended to contradict and cast doubt upon his testimony that he went to his bedroom alone and
locked the door on the night in question because that

is

just

What he “usually”

Ls. 1 9-20.) Thus, the district court properly admitted evidence that

in the past without going in his

bedroom and locking

did.

(TL, p.578,

Reyes had fought with

his wife

the door.

Despite instructing the prosecutor that he should not connect the past ﬁght between Reyes

and Marina

t0

any criminal charges (TL, p.587, Ls.4-13), the

district court

overruled defense

counsel’s objection t0 the prosecutor listing the past criminal charges (Tr., p.596, Ls. 13-24). That

was
to

error.

While the

details surrounding the past

show that Reyes did not

ﬁght between Reyes and Marina were relevant

act according to his alleged practice, the criminal charges related to the

16

past ﬁght were not relevant to Reyes’s practice,

impeachment and were thus

which means they could not be used

irrelevant.

was harmless. “T0

Nevertheless, the erroneous admission of the past criminal charges
establish harmless error, the State

must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained

0f did not contribute t0 the verdict obtained.’” State

814 (2014). “‘In other words, the error

same without

Any

the error.” State V.

is

harmless

V. Parker,

if the

157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806,

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

38,

44 (2017)?

prejudice from the jury hearing most of the past criminal charges

reduced When Reyes clariﬁed on re-direct that the
interfering with a witness.

as

(Tr.,

p.607, Ls.10-21.)

state

had dismissed

And

there

all

was

drastically

of the charges except

was n0 prejudice from

the jury

hearing about the charge for interfering With a witness because Reyes had already testiﬁed, Without
objection, that he

had been convicted of that charge. (TL, p.594, L.21 — p.595,

Furthermore, as mentioned above, the

district court

the prosecutor’s questioning as to the past incident and,

repeatedly sustained objections t0 curb

when necessary, simultaneously instructed

the jury “t0 disregard the last question” and t0 “[n]ot give

2

L.5.)

any consideration

at all.”

(TL, p.602,

Despite the Idaho Supreme Court’s clear articluation 0f the harmless error standard in

Em

Montgomery, Reyes argues that it is not the correct standard. (Appellant’s brief, p.18.) Since
Reyes ﬁled his opening brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this exact argument.
V. Joslin, No. 45629, slip 0p. at 4-5 (Idaho Ct. App. October 8, 2019).

17

m

L.7 — p.604, L22.) This Court “presume[s] that the jury followed the jury instructions.”

M,

151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (201

Any residual prejudice

1).3

did not affect Reyes’s substantial rights because the state presented

overwhelming evidence of Reyes’s

guilt.

E

Montgomery, 163 Idaho

at 46,

408 P.3d

at

44

(ﬁnding error harmless “[b]ased 0n the overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery
trial”).

The

state

presented testimony from two eye-Witnesses

at

both 0f Whom testiﬁed that

at trial,

they personally saw Reyes (1) act physically aggressive toward Marina immediately before the

ﬁght in the bedroom,
(3) pull

Marina

stand up.

to the

(2)

choke Marina With his right hand while holding an iron in his

ground by her

hair,

and

(4) kick

Marina

in the face While she

was

left

hand,

trying t0

(TL, p.216, Ls.4-13, p.218, Ls.12-24, p.219, Ls.9-15, p.222, Ls.5-18, p.270, Ls.3-22,

p.272, Ls.4-8, p.273, L.14

— p.274,

iron at Marina. (TL, p.220, L.25

The

state

L.21.) Laura also testiﬁed that she

— p.221,

saw Reyes throw a

clothes

L.5.)

corroborated the eye-witness accounts with physical evidence, including

photographs of the blood-covered pillow that Marina had laid her head 0n after being kicked
unconscious (State’s Exs. 53-55), photographs 0f Marina’s injuries (State’s Exs. 13-42), and
testimony from an emergency room doctor and a dentist conﬁrming that Marina sustained serious
injuries t0 her face

and

p.327, L.21, p.332, L.6

3

injuries t0 her

—

p.333, L.15).

upper body

(T12,

p.309, L.9

— p.310,

While the jury did not hear

In Reyes’s opening brief, in the harmless error section

on this

issue,

L.16, p.326, L.22

directly

from Marina, both

he brieﬂy comments that the

prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. (Appellant’s brief, p.19.) That

E

—

is

insufﬁcient t0

of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal.
Bach V. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790,
229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (“We Will not consider an issue not ‘supported by argument and
authority in the opening brief.’”). And Reyes’s trial counsel did not obj ect 0n that basis at trial, so
Reyes would have had to show fundamental error on appeal, which he did not even attempt t0 do.
State V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

raise the claim

m
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medical professionals testiﬁed that she told them the injuries were caused by domestic abuse, and
the doctor testiﬁed that

p.309, L.4

— p.3 10,

Marina identiﬁed Reyes

as the perpetrator.4 (Tr., p.330, L.4

overwhelming evidence, Reyes called two witnesses whose testimonies

contradicted each other and the other evidence presented at

and

at

L. 1 5,

L.16.)

In the face 0f this

jail

— p.333,

home, testiﬁed

0n her face on the back

heard banging and yelling.

Reynolds, Reyes’s neighbor in

on the night the abuse occurred, he saw Marina

that,

patio,

trial.

after she

had

fallen

he watched Marina walk into the house, and—within a minute—he

(Tr.,

p.610, L.8

— p.620,

L. 1

.)

But Ofﬁcer King testiﬁed that there was

n0 blood on the back patio Where Reynolds claimed Marina

fell

and injured

herself.

(TL, p.390,

L.20 — p.391, L.2.) And, for the events of the night to unfold as Reynolds claimed, the jury would

have had to reach the

illogical conclusion that

Marina decided

husband “[W]ithin a minute” of falling so hard on the patio
three

ofher front

teeth.

(Tr.,

p.309, L.4

Reyes’s testimony had

husband

all

p.578, L.23

broke

down

— p.580,

L. 14.)

The

broke her nose and fractured

bedroom door and attacked him While he was

sleeping.

He testiﬁed that Marina “climbed on top of the bed and

“move her t0

testiﬁed that he had

Ls.3-7.)

claimed that Marina, Laura, and Laura’s

(Tr.,

started hitting

the side.” (Tr., p.580, Ls.8-18.) Yet, despite this physical

by Marina—and Marina’s nose bleeding sufﬁciently from her

blood—Reyes

4

that she

ﬁght With her sleeping

— p.3 10, L.16, p.330, L.4 — p.333, L.15, p.617,

own problems. Reyes

the locked

[him]” and that he had t0
assault

its

to pick a

injuries to

no blood on himself after the ﬁght was

soak a pillow in

over. (Tr., p.582, Ls.7-

read Marina’s preliminary hearing testimony t0 the jury, and this Court can
consider that as part of the overwhelming evidence if it ﬁnds the district court properly admitted
state also

that testimony.

E inﬂ

Part

II.

But, as demonstrated here, the state presented overwhelming

evidence of Reyes’s guilt even absent

all

of the evidence challenged 0n appeal.
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9.) In fact,

Reyes’s version of events made n0 mention of blood or how 0r

the serious injuries that she sustained. (T12, p.573, L.13

— p.582,

In short, Reye’s defense required the jury t0 believe that

less than

one minute before

starting the

when Marina

sustained

L.12.)

Marina broke her nose and teeth

ﬁght and that Reyes did not notice the

injuries or get

any

blood 0n himself during the ﬁght even though Marina drenched a pillow in blood from her pre-

ﬁght injuries after the ﬁght.

N0 reasonable juror could d0 so. Any error was thus harmless because

the state’s evidence, including eye-witness testimony, physical evidence, and testimony

from

medical professionals, was overwhelming.

II.

The

District

A.

Court Did Not

Commit Reversible

Error

When It Found Marina Was Unavailable

Introduction

The

district court

witness for the
Witness

is

state.

did not abuse

T0 show

absent from the

its

discretion

When

it

found Marina was unavailable as a

unavailability, the rule requires only that a party

trial at

the time the prior testimony

is

state

trial

put on multiple Witnesses

Even

when

abused

its

discretion

When

it

serve Marina with a subpoena.

found Marina unavailable, the error

was harmless because Marina became unavailable when she invoked
avoid testifying.

Here, Marina was

the state read her preliminary hearing transcript, and the

who detailed their fruitless efforts t0

if the district court

(1) the

introduced t0 the jury and (2) the

party tried in good faith to secure the witness’s attendance but failed.
indisputably absent from the

show

the Fifth

Amendment

to

Thus, the state could have read Marina’s preliminary hearing transcript once

Marina physically came

to the trial

and invoked the Fifth Amendment.
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Standard

B.

Of Review

“The determination of Whether a Witness
testimony

admissible,

is

0f discretion.” State

C.

V.

is

District

evidentiary in nature. Evidentiary decisions are reviewed for an abuse

The

district court

Court Did Not Abuse

state.

unavailable, such that preliminary hearing

Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 785, 435 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2019).

The

witness for the

is

did not abuse

Its

its

Discretion

discretion

When

unavailable t0 testify at

.

.

(Ct.

able,

presence

But, if the declarant

may

be admitted.

absent from the

or hearing

by process 0r other reasonable means,

to procure

The

rule requires that the proponent

at trial.” State V.

“make

a

Button, 134 Idaho 864, 868, 11

made

a

good

faith effort to obtain

Marina’s presence

at trial.

While the

investigator served a subpoena With an incorrect date, he quickly realized the mistake

prosecutor’s ofﬁce tried multiple times t0 correct

The

I.R.E.

App. 2000).

Here, the state

correct date.

is

trial

I.R.E. 804(a)(5).

faith effort to obtain the witness’s

P.3d 483, 487

I.R.E. 801, 802.

A declarant is unavailable When the declarant “is

the declarant’s attendance.”

good

found Marina was unavailable as a

former testimony given under oath

trial,

and the statement’s proponent has not been

.

it

Generally, the rule against hearsay prohibits the admission 0f out 0f court

statements offered for the truth 0f the matter asserted.

804(b)(1)(A).

When It Found Marina Was Unavailable

district court

scheduling issues With the

trial.

it

by attempting

expressly stated that

(TL, p.354, L.16

it

— p.355,

to serve a

subpoena with the

understood the mistake given
L.4, p.364, Ls.5-1 1.)

and the

all

of the

More importantly,

the state detailed—through four different witnesses—the signiﬁcant efforts taken to try to serve

Marina with a subpoena. (TL, p.35 1, L.14 — p.354, L.12 (Lindauer describing four
t0 try to serve subpoena); Tr., p.356, Ls.1-22

serve subpoena); Tr., p.358, L.25

—

(Thompson describing four

different trips

different trips to try to

p.359, L.5 (Smith explaining she tried numerous times to
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phone and

contact Marina Via

text messages); Tr., p.345, L.11

—

p.346, L.18 (Ofﬁcer Ivie

explaining he “spent several hours” at Marina’s house trying t0 serve a subpoena on the ﬁrst day
oftrial)

ﬂ alﬂ

to serve

Marina the night of the ﬁrst day of trial and the morning 0f the second day of trial).) Based

0n

Tr.,

p.343, L.24

— p.344,

L.1 (prosecutor explaining that the Caldwell Police tried

that testimony, the district court did not abuse

unavailable for

trial

discretion

its

When

it

found that Marina was

because she had “been actively avoiding the service 0f process.” (TL, p.364,

Ls.3-5.)

Reyes argues

Marina was not unavailable

that

time the state read her preliminary

at the

hearing transcript t0 the jury because the defense had subpoenaed Marina t0 testify in

Marina showed up on the

last

day of trial. (Appellant’s

meant Marina was not “absent from the

At

trial” as the rule requires for

Reyes reads too much

I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A).

brief, pp.24-25.)

into the “absent

from the

its

case and

In Reyes’s View, that

a ﬁnding of unavailability.
trial”

language of the

rule.

the time the state read the transcript of Marina’s preliminary hearing testimony to the jury,

Marina was indisputably “absent from the
showing

that the Witness Will

language 0f the

rule,

ﬂQ

Witness if the declarant

.

.

.

trial.”

Li.

Reyes’s reading, that a party must make a

remain absent from the entire

(explaining that “[a] declarant

is

absent from the

trial

.”
.

.

and

trial,

trial

a party cannot

show

that a witness Will

in the plain

considered t0 be unavailable as a

is

the proponent’s

secure the declarant’s attendance have failed (emphases added».

result:

ﬁnds no support

It

good

faith efforts t0

would also produce an illogical

remain absent from the entire

trial until after

the

has ended, at Which point the party could n0 longer present evidence.
Similarly, the rule does not support Reyes’s reliance

availability as to the state.

that “the statement

’s

Under

0n the defense subpoena

t0

the plain language 0f the rule, the second requirement

proponent has not been

able,

by process 0r other reasonable means,
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is

show
only

t0 procure

.

.

.

the declarant’s attendance.” Li. (emphasis added). Nothing in the rule forces the statement’s

proponent to allow his opponent t0 choose when the Witness will attend.

Reyes also urges the application of the rule

that a Witness is not unavailable

because he or she cannot be present 0n a particular day.” State

App. 2007);

m,

ﬂ

V. Perry,

State V. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 868-69, 11 P.3d 483,

unavailable simply because he could not
11 P.3d at 487-88.

make

The Witness had missed

P.3d

at

at 867,

P.3d

at

1 1

485.

to a particular

his ﬂight

“he could obtain another ﬂight Which would
at 866, 11

it

.

.

.

from

arrive in

When

(Ct.

it

declared a Witness

Twin Falls but

Falls [at] 2:00

it

and observed

take a later ﬂight.”

The

rule

that “all indications

I_d.

from

at

868-69, 11 P.3d

m

were
at

that [the witness]

at the trial.

was

ready, willing, and able to

m,

Where the Witness was

district court

found that Marina had “been actively avoiding the service of process” from the

may

was never

487-88.

has no application here. Unlike in

Rule 804

Li

found the witness unavailable,

ready and willing t0 testify but delayed by travel inconveniences, the

Ls.3-5 (emphasis added).)

868-69,

that day. Li.

the Idaho Court 0f Appeals expressly noted that the witness’s “Willingness to appear

tested”

at

indicated that

pm.”

And the witness “had not indicated an unwillingness to be”

486. In holding that the district court erred When

(Ct.

App. 2000). In

day of trial. 134 Idaho

Seattle t0

Twin

144 Idaho 266, 269

487-77

the Idaho Court 0f Appeals held that the district court erred

“merely

state.

speciﬁcally

(T12,

p.364,

not allow a party t0 designate a Witness unavailable

“merely because he or she cannot be present 0n a particular day,”
does not require that party t0 cede the decision 0f when to
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call

m,

a Witness

144 Idaho

Who

is

at

269, but

it

“actively avoiding

the service 0f process” to the party’s opponent with

the plain language 0f the rule,

whom the witness

Marina was “absent from the

is

cooperating.5 Applying

trial” at the

time the state read her

preliminary hearing transcript and “the statement’s proponent ha[d] not been able, by process 0r
other reasonable means, to procure

.

.

.

[Marina’s] attendance,” I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A) (emphasis

added). Thus, the district court did not err

In any event, if the district erred

for three reasons: First,

when

when

it

it

found Marina unavailable.

found Marina unavailable, the error was harmless

any error was harmless because, even

if Marina

was not unavailable

time the state read the preliminary hearing transcript, she became unavailable later in the
she successfully invoked her Fifth
declarant

is

privilege applies.”)

.

I.R.E. 804(a)(1)

.

.

is

(“A

exempted from

0f the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a

the state actually read

Amendment right not t0 testify.

it, it

became admissible when Marina

ﬂ, gg, State V. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 426-

414 P.3d 234, 248-49 (2017) (holding erroneous admission 0f testimony harmless because the

same evidence was properly admitted
812 P.2d 1227, 1232
the evidence

(Ct.

Fifth

later in the trial); State V.

Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1071,

App. 1990) (holding erroneous admission of evidence harmless because

became admissible

Reyes argues 0n appeal

5

m

when

Thus, any error was harmless because, even ifMarina’s preliminary hearing

was not admissible when

invoked her Fifth
27,

right not to testify.

considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant

testifying about the subject matter

transcript

Amendment

trial

at the

later in the trial).

that the district court erred

Amendment. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.25-26.)

when

it

allowed Marina t0 invoke the

But Reyes did not object

to

Marina invoking

Marina was cooperating with Reyes’s counsel. Reyes’s counsel
represented t0 the court that he had met with Marina twice in his ofﬁce, that she had contacted him
t0 discuss the state’s subpoena With the incorrect date, and that he successfully served her With a

The record

is

clear that

subpoena. (TL, p.344, Ls.2-19.)
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the Fifth

V.

Amendment

in the district court

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

party’s position

ﬂ

appeal.”);

and thus cannot

raise

it

as an issue

on appeal.

Em

_, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“To be clear, both the issue and the

0n the issue must be raised before the

State V. Giles,

4 P.3d 630, 633-34

trial

(Ct.

court for

it

t0

be properly preserved for

App. Kan. 2000) (holding,

in context

of

deciding whether Witness was unavailable, that defendant cannot challenge invocation 0f Fifth

Amendment on

appeal

rights at the time

Even

When “he

did not challenge the Victim’s assertion of her Fifth

0f trial”).

if Reyes

could jump that procedural hurdle, the

could invoke the Fifth Amendment. The

district court

the state during the preliminary hearing but that she

Witness.

(Lg,

Amendment

Tr.,

specter 0f perjury.

p.344, Ls.2-19.)

If

Marina testiﬁed

E

properly found Marina

knew that Marina had testiﬁed 0n behalf 0f

was now,

for all intents

and purposes, a defense

Marina’s decision t0 change teams, as
at trial in

a

way

it

were, raised the

that contradicted her preliminary hearing

testimony, she could be handing the state evidence of a past

allowed her to avoid.6

district court

crime—a result the

Fifth

Amendment

U.S. Const. amend. V.

More t0 the point, however,

for purposes 0f Rule 804,

it

does not matter

if the district court

correctly ruled that a privilege applies; the condition that triggers unavailability

is

the witness

being “exempted from testifying about the subj ect matter 0f the declarant’s statement because the

6

Reyes also argues

was concerned that Marina had committed perjury at
should not have allowed the state to use Marina’s preliminary hearing

that if the district court

the preliminary hearing,

it

any way in the district
439 P.3d at 1271. In fact, Reyes
managed t0 waive this argument not just once but twice because he failed to cite any rule of
Bach V. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229
evidence (0r any authority whatsoever) t0 support it.
P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (“We will not consider an issue not ‘supported by argument and authority
in the opening brief.” (emphasis added». The state also notes that it is not aware 0f any rule 0f
evidence that precludes the admission 0f testimony based 0n the district court’s mere suspicion
transcript.

This

is,

yet again, another argument that

court and therefore waived.

ﬂ

Reyes

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho

at

E

that

it

was

the product of perjury.
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failed t0 assert in

_,

court rules that a privilege applies.” I.R.E. 804(a)(1) (emphasis added).

from

testifying about the abuse because, right or

invoke the Fifth Amendment.

wrong, the

Marina was exempted

district court ruled that

(TL, p.564, Ls.6-21, p.571, L.11

— p.572, L25.)

Marina could
That alone

triggered the hearsay exception.

Second, any error in the presentation of Marina’s preliminary hearing testimony was
harmless because her preliminary hearing testimony was duplicative of other evidence presented

E, 1g”

to the jury.

State V. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055,

1059 (2003)

(holding erroneous admission ofreport harmless because “[t]he report was a duplicate oftestimony

under oath”); Leliefeld

V.

Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 369-70, 659 P.2d 111, 123-24 (1983) (holding

erroneous admission of evidence harmless because

admitted evidence”).

choked
L.1

1.)

her,

“was largely duplicative 0f admissible and

In the preliminary hearing testimony,

and broke her nose and teeth by kicking her

The jury heard

dentist.7

it

essentially the

The doctor testiﬁed

that

Marina testiﬁed

in the face.

same thing from Marina Via

Marina told him

that “she

that

Reyes

(TL, p.370, L.20

hit her,

—

p.375,

the testimony 0f her doctor and

was beat up” and “strangled” by her

“husband,” and he conﬁrmed that she had numerous injuries, including “swelling to the forehead,”
“swelling to the nose,” “bruising around the face,
nose. (Tn, p.330, L.4

— p.333,

9) 66

redness in the upper chest area,” and a broken

L. 1 5.) Similarly, the dentist testiﬁed that

Marina told him “she had

been the Victim 0f domestic trauma” and had “been kicked in the face,” and he conﬁrmed

had “some

7

soft tissue

that she

trauma” and that “three of her front teeth had fractured.” (TL, p.309, L.4 —

Marina’s statements t0 her doctor and dentist were admitted for the truth 0f the matter asserted

as statements

made

for the purpose

0f medical diagnosis or treatment.

E

I.R.E. 803(4); State V.

Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 216, 953 P.2d 650, 656 (Ct. App. 1998) (explaining the medical diagnoses
hearsay exception “is premised 0n the assumption that such statements are generally trustworthy

because the declarant

is

motivated by a desire to receive proper medical treatment and will

therefore be truthful in giving pertinent information t0 the physician”).
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The preliminary hearing testimony was

p.310, L.16.)

also largely duplicative 0f both Laura’s

testimony and Laura’s husband’s testimony. For example, Laura testiﬁed that Reyes

threw an iron
p.215, L.16

at

Marina,

Marina, choked Marina, and knocked Marina out by kicking her in the face. (TL,

— p.223,

L.19.)

Third, any error in the admission 0f Marina’s preliminary hearing testimony

was harmless

because, as explained above, the state presented overwhelming evidence of Reyes’s

s_um

hit

Part I.C. Reyes has thus failed to

show

found Marina unavailable and any error in the

guilt.

m

reversible error because the district court properly

district court’s

decision

was harmless.

III.

The

Commit Reversible Error When It Admitted Evidence That Reyes
Was On Probation And, As A Condition Of Probation, Could Not Be In A Bar

District

The

Court Did Not

state

Reyes about

concedes that the

his felony probation

district court erred

at

For

it

allowed the prosecutor to question

and the probation conditions

drink alcohol. (Appellant’s brief, pp.27-28.)

163 Idaho

when

that

he not be present in a bar 0r

The error, however, was harmless.

starters, the

to the charges

prejudice arising from the probation questions

by going

he faced

at trial.

t0 a bar

E

was

like the

limited t0 Reyes

and drinking alcohol—relatively minor crimes compared

United States

V.

Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 862 (6th Cir. 2018)

(observing the risk of unfair prejudice in the form of propensity “is heightened

much

Montgomery,

45-46, 408 P.3d at 43-44.

Violating his probation

is

m

when

the prior act

charged conduct”). Immediately prior t0 the probation question, Reyes testiﬁed

without objection that he had been convicted 0f the felony crime 0f interfering with a witness.

— p.595,

(T12,

p.594, L.21

new

crimes because the jury already

L.8.)

So, the

mere

fact that

knew he had

Reyes was 0n probation did not reveal any

a conviction for Which he would have been

punished. The limited prejudice arising from the jury’s knowledge that Reyes violated the terms

27

0f his probation when he went t0 a bar and drank beer did not affect Reyes’s substantial rights
because, as explained above, the state presented overwhelming evidence 0f Reyes’s

guilt.

E

supra Part LC.

IV.

The

A.

District Court

Did Not Commit Reversible Error When It Admitted Laura’s Testimony That
She Asked The Police To Lie

Introduction

The

district court

request that the police

lie to

Laura’s explanation for

When

did not err

it

allowed the prosecutor t0 draw the sting 0f Laura’s

Reyes. Even if the

Why

district court

she asked the police t0

lie

Marina’s niece and thus did not prejudice Reyes but, in

B.

did

err,

the error

was harmless because

highlighted her bias toward Marina as

fact,

hurt the state.

Of Review

Standard

The relevance of evidence

subject to free review.

is

E

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 779,

419 P.3d 1042, 1077 (2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Allowed The Prosecutor T0 Ask Laura About Her
Request T0 The Police That TheV Lie T0 Reyes

As

a preliminary matter, Reyes’s challenge

adequately preserved in the

district court.

testimony that she asked the police to
explanation

Why

she

made

Why

Reyes

that request.

counsel only objected to the

preserved in the

tell

latter.

district court is

she asked the ofﬁcers to

(Tr.,

E

appeal,

is

Reyes

broader than the challenge he
tries t0

challenge (1) Laura’s

that the neighbors called the police

(Appellant’s brief, pp.29-3
p.226, L.18

whether the

lie.

On

on appeal

—

But, at

trial,

Reyes’s

p.227, L.15.) Thus, the only issue Reyes

district court erred

when

it

State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,
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1 .)

and (2) Laura’s

allowed Laura to explain

_, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271

(2019) (“T0 be clear, both the issue and the party’s position 0n the issue must be raised before the
trial

court for

The

it

t0

be properly preserved for appeal.”).

district court

did not abuse

its

from Laura discrediting her testimony.
(holding that “the state

was

the witness,

police to

direct”);

may attack the witness’s

lie t0

E

When

c_f.

it

allowed the prosecutor t0

State V. Sanders,

entitled t0 ‘draw the sting”

0n

discrediting [the Witness]

discretion

I.R.E.

750 N.E.2d 90, 110 (Ohio 2001)

of cross—examination by bringing out facts

607 (“Any party, including the party

credibility”).

ﬁrst elicited—without objection—the

lie

damaging testimony

about circumstances related t0 the alleged abuse.

come

for that information t0

out on cross—examination, adopted a strategy of full disclosure. (TL, p.226, L.18

the police to

that called

The prosecutor knew that Laura had asked the

Reyes about Who called the police and, rather than wait

The prosecutor

elicit facts

that

— p.227,

L.15.)

Laura had asked

(TL, p.226, Ls.18-22.)

The

prosecutor then drew the sting 0f that testimony by having Laura explain her request t0 the jury.
(T11,

p.226, L.23

Reyes

— p.227,

relies

0n

L.15.)

State V. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,

253 P.3d 727 (201

1),

t0 argue that the

prosecutor’s questions were improper because “‘a witness’s credibility and character

supported before

62,

253 P.3d

it

has been attacked.” (Appellant’s

at 736).) In Ellington, the state elicited

brief,

p.30 (quoting Ellington, 15 1 Idaho

from a forensic audio analyst

his job after only

two months because researching the defendant’s case

inability t0 sleep.”

15 1 Idaho at 62, 253 P.3d at 736.

The

may not be

state

that

he had quit

“left [him]

asked the analyst

at

why he

with the
left after

only two months “t0 explain that [the forensic audio analyst’s] short time working on the case was
‘not because

ofpoor performance 0r for a reason related to his

ability to

d0 his job well.”

I_d.

The

Idaho Supreme Court found the question and answer improper because “the testimony the
prosecutor

was attempting

t0 elicit

.

.

.

was

.

.

.

highly prejudicial and irrelevant” and the state had

29

when “a witness’s

only “anticipated impeachment 0r attacks”
supported before
This

is

it

an attack;

it

sting using Laura’s explanation that she

Ellington,

Here, the state did not try t0 support Laura’s

ﬁrst attacked Laura’s credibility by eliciting that she asked the police

t0 lie about circumstances surrounding the

(TL, p.226, L.18

and character may not be

has been attacked.” Li. (emphasis added).

a different case than Ellington.

credibility before

credibility

—

p.227, L.15.)

abuse and then, only after that attack, the

made

state

drew the

the request to protect her relationship With Marina.

Furthermore, unlike the information elicited by the state in

Which was “highly prejudicial”

Idaho

t0 the defendant, 151

at 62,

253 P.3d

at

736, the

information here beneﬁtted the defendant. Speciﬁcally, Laura’s explanation that she had requested
the police to

lie in

order t0 protect her relationship with the Victim highlighted Laura’s bias in the

case as Marina’s niece.

Thus, the

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

when

it

allowed the

prosecutor to use a draW-the-sting strategy.

Even

if the district court erred in

the 911 call, the error

allowing the admission of Laura’s testimony related to

was harmless because Laura’s testimony lacked any

prejudicial content.

m, gg, State V. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27, 205 P.3d 671, 676 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding erroneous
admission of evidence harmless because

it

“had no prejudicial content”); Sanchez

V.

Galey, 112

Idaho 609, 623, 733 P.2d 1234, 1248 (1986) (ﬁnding erroneous admission 0f evidence harmless

“due t0

its

lack ofprejudicial effect”).

No reasonable juror could draw a harmful inference toward

Reyes—unfair or otherwise—based on Laura’s explanation

that she

asked the ofﬁcers t0

lie

because she wanted t0 preserve her relationship With Marina.

Reyes argues

that this

(Appellant’s brief, pp.30-31.)

she asked the police to

lie

was a “backdoor attempt

t0 tell the jury that

Mr. Reyes

That ignores Laura’s actual testimony. Laura did not

because she feared Reyes.
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(E

Tr.,

p.226, L.23

—

is

feared.”

testify that

p.227, L.15.)

She

testiﬁed that she asked the police to

—

lie to

protect her relationship with Marina. (TL, p.226, L.23

p.227, L.15.) Reyes offers n0 reasonable explanation—and the state can think of

none—how

Laura’s response could be interpreted as Laura saying she feared Reyes.
In fact, Laura’s explanation actually beneﬁtted

Reyes on

testiﬁed Without objection that she asked the ofﬁcers t0

that

Reyes

Laura asked the police

t0 lie

Laura had already

that the neighbors called the

Had the prosecutor just moved 0n after that

police. (TL, p.226, Ls. 1 8-22.)

have reasonably inferred

tell

this issue.

answer, the jury could

because she feared Reyes.

But the

follow-up question and answer—the only question and answer t0 Which Reyes’s counsel

objected—actually dispelled that damaging inference.

It

turned out that Laura’s request had

nothing to do with any fear 0f Reyes and everything to do with Laura’s relationship with Marina.
p.226, L.18

(T12,

potentially

—

Because Laura’s explanation 0f her request dispelled the

p.227, L.15.)

damaging inference

that

Laura feared Reyes, any error in the

Laura to provide that explanation beneﬁtted Reyes and was thus harmless.

district court

E

126 Idaho 892, 895, 894 P.2d 125, 128 (1995) (holding error harmless because
trial

court’s error beneﬁtted [the defendant]”); State V.

Any

ﬂowed t0

guilt.

E

if any,

“[i]f anything, the

from the introduction 0f the

[the defendant]”).

error in the admission of Laura’s testimony related to the 911 call

because, as explained above,

State V. Johnson,

Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 436, 489 P.2d 13 10,

1316 (1971) (holding error harmless because “the beneﬁts,
statements obviously

allowing

ﬂ

was

also harmless

Part I.C., the state presented overwhelming evidence of Reyes’s

Montgomery, 163 Idaho

at 46,

408 P.3d
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at 44.

V.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct
A.

In

Her Closing Argument

Introduction

The prosecutor did not commit misconduct when she made a comment
argument based 0n the evidence. The prosecutor argued to the jury

Amendment,

at least in part,

The prosecutor

love, honor,

and cherish her did

explicitly connected the statement t0 Corporal

Marina invoked the
a

room

this to her.”

(Tr.,

because she was “probably scared” t0

Who vowed t0

that the person

that

in her closing

“[t]ell

full

Fifth

0f strangers

p.653, Ls.5-13.)

Cameron’s expert testimony (TL,

p.652, Ls. 1 8-23), which included Corporal Cameron’s opinion that domestic Violence Victims are
often too embarrassed to

Standard

B.

Where

tell

strangers about their

own

abuse

(Tr.,

p.45 1 Ls.15-23).
,

Of Review

the defendant objects t0 alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the trial court, this

Court ﬁrst “determine[s] factually

if there

Whether the error was harmless.” State

V.

was

prosecutorial misconduct” and then “determine[s]

Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868, 332 P.3d 767, 780 (2014).

The Prosecutor’s Argument Was Based On The Evidence

C.

The

district court

did not err

When

it

overruled Reyes’s obj ection during the prosecutor’s

closing argument. “[I]n reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court ‘must keep

in

mind

the realities of trial.’”

State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, 169,

426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018)

(quoting State V. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)). Closing arguments “are

seldom carefully constructed
left

in toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax

imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear.” Donnellv V. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-

47 (1974). “[A] court should not
have

its

lightly infer that a prosecutor intends

most damaging meaning or

an ambiguous remark t0

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will
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draw

that

meaning from the plethora 0f less damaging

m,

perfect trial.”

“‘There

fully,

it.’”

from

is

164 Idaho

at 169,

interpretations.” Li.

426 P.3d

not necessarily a

considerable latitude in closing argument, and both sides are entitled t0 discuss

164 Idaho

said, ‘[p]rosecutoria1

at

and the inferences

1269 (quotes and

that should

be drawn from

“This Court has

ellipsis omitted).

misconduct occurs When the State attempts t0 secure a verdict 0n any factor

reasonable inferences that

_, 443 P.3d 129, 136

by the jury

may

instructions

and the evidence admitted

be drawn from that evidence.” State

at trial,

V. Miller,

including

165 Idaho 115,

(2019) (brackets in original, emphases added).

Here, the prosecutor’s

ﬁlll

426 P.3d

at 169,

other than the law as set forth

abuse in “a room

fair trial is

at 1269.

their respective standpoints, the evidence

m,

“A

comment

that

Marina was “probably scared”

t0 testify about the

of strangers” was based 0n the evidence and reasonable inferences that could

be drawn from the evidence. (TL, p.652, L.11 — p.653, L.19.) Corporal Cameron testiﬁed, as an
expert witness,8 that Victims 0f domestic abuse “have low self—esteem” and “a sense 0f

hopelessness” because “[t]hey have been isolated from friends and family” and can be

“embarrassed t0 g0 forward and talk about” their abuse.

(TL, p.451, L.6

prosecutor expressly relied on Corporal Cameron’s testimony, as well as

—

p.452, L.13.)

The

common sense, to support

her comment:

Corporal Sheri Cameron told you that police departments like the Boise Police
Department have t0 have special detectives to deal with cases like this. Why?
Because Victims recant. Because they’re reluctant t0 come in and tell what’s

happened.

emergency room doctors, t0 a dentist,
from her again today shouldn’t prevent
you from doing What needs to be done. You have all 0f the evidence t0 convict the
defendant in this case 0f all 0f these charges.
Marina was brave enough

under oath. The

8

fact that

to tell her story t0

you didn’t hear

it

Reyes did not obj ect t0 Corporal Cameron testifying as an expert Witness on the topic 0f domestic

Violence. (TL, p.464, Ls.12-18.)

33

Certainly Marina

is

probably scared.

[Obj ection]

Why would she want t0 come in and say what happened again? Tell a roomful] 0f
who vowed t0 love, honor, and cherish her did this t0 her

strangers that the person

(T12,

p.652, L.18

because

it

—

The prosecutor’s argument was thus proper

p.653, L.13 (emphases added).)

was based 0n

“the evidence admitted at

be drawn from that evidence.”

m,

165 Idaho

trial,

at

including reasonable inferences that

_, 443 P.3d

may

at 136.

Reyes’s argument that the prosecutor’s statement implied that Marina “did not testify

because she was scared of Mr. Reyes” ﬁnds n0 support in the record. (Appellant’s

The prosecutor made no mention of Marina

(ﬂ

was

scared.

that

“Marina

is

Tr.,

room

again? Tell a

room

her.

.”
.

— p.653,

L.19.)

Reyes before or

On the

after her

comment that Marina

contrary, immediately after

commenting

probably scared,” the prosecutor connected Marina’s fear to her reluctance to

her story to a

this to

p.652, L.24

fearing

brief, p.33.)

.

full

full

of strangers:

“Why would

of strangers that the person

she want t0

come

who vowed t0

in

tell

and say what happened

love, honor,

and cherish her did

(TL, p.653, Ls.5-13.)

And just before making
Marina was brave enough

the allegedly improper

to tell her story t0

comment, the prosecutor emphasized

an emergency room doctor and a

that

dentist. (Tn, p.652,

L.24 — p.653, L5.) The prosecutor could not have been referring to Marina’s bravery in the face

0f a fear ofReyes because Reyes was not present when Marina told the doctor and dentist that

Reyes had abused

When

(ﬂ

Tr., p.3 12,

Ls.19-23, p.334, Ls.14-18.)

read in context, then, the prosecutor’s

telling strangers

L.19.) That

her.

is

comment

referred only t0 Marina’s fear of

about her abuse and not to Marina’s fear 0f Reyes.

(E

Tr., p.652,

not only a reasonable reading of the prosecutor’s argument,

34

it is

the

L.18 — p.653,

meaning

that

Reyes’s

own

counsel attributed to the prosecutor’s argument at

trial:

he told the jury that the

prosecutor “would like you t0 believe that [Marina] doesn’t want t0 get on the stand because she ’s

g0 through

fearful ofhaving t0

should

rej ect

argument.

this

again.” (TL, p.665, Ls.13-16 (emphasis added).) This Court

Reyes’s attempt 0n appeal to attribute a more nefarious meaning to the prosecutor’s

ﬂ

Donnelly, 416 U.S.

at

646-47 (“[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor

intends an ambiguous remark to have

its

most damaging meaning or

that a jury, sitting through

lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.”)

Reyes also argues
did not testify at the

trial

that the prosecutor improperly misled the jury

due

to her fear

“[t]he only reason she did not testify”

is

that she feared a perjury charge

(Appellant’s brief, pp.33-34 (emphasis added).)

situation.

true that

which she did
L.16.)

that

Marina did not have

to testify

and invoked the Fifth

His argument oversimpliﬁes the

because she invoked the Fifth Amendment,

in front 0fthe jury at Reyes’s insistence. (Tr., p.564, Ls.17-23, p.571, L.23

But Marina was not required

t0

Marina

of telling her story to strangers because, in Reyes’s View,

Amendment.
It is

by claiming

invoke the Fifth Amendment.

E

State V.

— p.572,

Hanson, 152

Idaho 314, 321-22, 271 P.3d 712, 719-20 (2012) (explaining a person can waive his or her Fifth

Amendment

rights).

And

a reasonable juror

abuse would choose t0 exercise her Fifth

may have wondered why an

Amendment

alleged Victim of brutal

right not t0 testify against the

man Who

allegedly choked her, punched her, and knocked her out cold With a kick to the face. Accordingly,

it

fell

within the “considerable latitude” afforded to parties in closing argument, Alwin, 164 Idaho

at 169,

426 P.3d

at

1269, for the prosecutor t0 argue that Marina chose not t0 testify

invoke the Fifth Amendment),

at least in part,

because she was “probably scared” t0
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(i.e.,

chose t0

“[t]ell

a

room

full

of strangers that the person

who vowed

t0 love, honor,

and cherish her did

this to

her”

(Tr.,

p.653, Ls.5-14).9

Even

if the district court erred

When

statement in closing argument, the error

it

overruled Reyes’s objection to the prosecutor’s

was harmless. The

district court instructed the

“the arguments and statements 0f the attorneys are not evidence” and,

reminded the jury again
L.8.)

that the statement

made up only a
1.)

1).

objected,

was merely “argument.” (TL, p.646, Ls.6-10, p.653,

This Court “presume[s] that the jury followed the jury instructions.” State

Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (201

L.1

When Reyes

jury that

V.

Carson, 151

Furthermore, the one statement that Reyes challenges

small portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument.

Finally, as explained above, the state presented

(E

Tr.,

p.650, L.15

— p.654,

overwhelming evidence against Reyes.

E

supra Part I.C.

VI.

Reyes Has Failed To Show The Cumulative Error Doctrine Requires
Reyes has

failed t0

“The presence 0f errors
process a defendant

is

.

.

.

show

the cumulative error doctrine requires a

does not by

itself require the reversal

entitled t0 a fair trial, not

855, 873, 332 P.3d 767, 785 (2014). For

of each potential

all

an error-free

A New Trial

new

trial in his case.

of a conviction, since under due

trial.”

State V.

Moses, 156 Idaho

ofthe reasons explained above as to the harmlessness

error, including the state presenting

the alleged errors in Reyes’s case does not require a

overwhelming evidence, any combination 0f

new

trial.

E

State V. Barcella, 135 Idaho

191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding multiple errors harmless because “there [was]

overwhelming evidence 0f Barcella’s

guilt”).

9

Reyes was, 0f course, free t0 offer his own explanation for why Marina chose t0 invoke the Fifth
Amendment—and he did. His counsel argued that Marina invoked the Fifth Amendment, not to
avoid perjury as Reyes now clams on appeal, but so that “she doesn’t have to be challenged about
any 0f her versions of the three different stories that she told.” (T12, p.665, L.13 — p.666, L.3.)
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction entered

after a

jury found Reyes guilty of domestic battery with a traumatic injury, attempted strangulation, and

aggravated assault.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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